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ABSTR ACT
In recent years the world economy has beensubject to large and
UnSyncronized changes in fiscal policies, high andvolatile real rates of
tnterest, large fluctuations in real exchangerates, and significant varia-
tions in private—sector spending. Thispaper reviews some of the key facts
characterizing the effects of fiscal policies during thefirst half of the
1980s and provides a simpleanalytical framework suitable for the inter-
pretation of these facts. The analytical frameworkbuilds on a two—country
model of the world economy which isapplied to the analysis of the transmis—
sion and effects of various changes in thetime profile of taxes and of
government spending. Generally, the predictions ofthe model concerning the
relation among the inter—country patterns ofconsumption, long and short—
term real rates of interest, realexchange rates and fiscal policies are
consistent with the stylized facts.
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(312)962—8253 (972)—3—42o—733In recent years the world economy has been subject tolarge and unsyncronized
changes in fiscal policies, high and volatile real rates ofinterest, large fluctua-
tions in real exchange rates and significant variations inprivate sector spending.
During the first half of the 1980s national fiscal policies have exhibitedlarge
divergencies. The United States adopted an expansionary course while theother major
countries taken together followed a relativelycontractionary course. Policies
undertaken by the major economies affected the rest of the worldthrough the in-
tegrated capital market. This paper deals with the internationaltransmission of
fiscal policies and their effects on real exchange rates andreal interest rates.
Section I reviews key facts and section II provides ananalytical framework relevant
for the interpretation of these facts.
I. Selected Facts
Since the beginning of 1980 short and long—term realrates of interest ex—
hibted different patterns. A weightedaverage of the annual short—term real interest
rates in the five major industrial countries (the UnitedStates, Canada, Japan
Germany and the United Kingdom) rose from 2.1 percent in January 1980 to .0percent
in July 1985; the corresponding long—term rates rose from 0.6percent in January 1980
to 5.7 percent in July 1985. Both rates peaked andsurpassed 8 percent in mid 1982.
Thus during 1980—85 real rates of interest have beenhigh (in comparison with early
1980) and the slope of the real yield curve which wasnegative until the third quar-
ter of 1981, has turned positive starting from mid 1982. Thesame period also witt—
nessed sharp changes in real exchange rates. In the firstquarter of 1985, the real
effective value of the U.S. dollar was about 143 percent above itsaverage value f or
the decade 19714—83 and 57 percent above its low point of the thirdquarter of 1980.
(The source of all data used in this paper is IMF, World EconomicOutlook, 1985).
These changes in real interest rates and real exchange rateswere associated
with large and divergent changes in world fiscal policies. Thebudget deficit of the2
General U.S. government as a fraction of GNP rose from about one percent in 1980 to
about 3.5 percent in 1985 (after reaching a peak of I.1 percent in 1983). At the
same time the budget deficit as a fraction of GNP declined in Japan, Germany and the
United Kingdom. Similarly, since 1980 according to IMF measures, the fiscal impulse
(which is a more exogenous measure of fiscal policy) has been expansionary for the
United States and contractionary for the other major industrial countries taken
together. Another indicator of the levels and divergence among national fiscal
policies is provided by a comparison among annual percentage changes in public—sector
consumption. As seen in Table 1 the percentage annual growth of U.S. public—sector
consumption accelerated in the past two years exceeding 4 percent in 1985. During
the late 1970s and early 1980s public—sector consumption in Japan grew faster than in
the United States (the difference reaching i4•3 percent in 1981), and during the past
two years it grew slower (the difference in "favor" of the United States reaching 2.1
percent in 1985).
Concomitantly, the annual percentage changes in real private—sector con-
sumption also displayed large fluctuations which differed across countries. In the
United States these changes ranged from 0.5 percent in 1980 to 5.3 percent in 1984
and, as seen in Table 1 ,thegrowth of private—sector consumption in Japan exceeded
that in the United States during 1978—80 and fell short of it during 1983—85 (the
differential growth rate of fixed investment displays a similar pattern).
II. A Conceptual Framework
In this section we outline a simple two—country model of the world economy
suitable for an interpretation of the facts outlined in section I. The model pro-
vides insights into the interactions among fiscal policies, interest rates, real
exchange rates and the comovements of private—sector consumption. In order to deal
with the real exchange rate we assume that each country produces internationally
tradable and non—tradable goods and, in view of the high correlation among nationalTABLE 1
DIFFERENCES IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONSUMPTION:
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 1977-85
(Annual Percentage Changes)
U.S. U.S. minus Japan
PrivatePublic Private Public
1977 5.0 1.5 +1.2 —2.14
1978 14.5 2.0 —0.2 —3.1
19792.7 1.3 —3.2 —3.0
19800.5 2.2 —0.8 —0.7
19812.0 0.9 +1.2 —14.3
1982 1.14 2.0 —2.8 +0.2
1983 14.8 —0.3 +1.5 —3.2
198)4 5.3 3.5 +2.14 +1.2
1985 11.1 14.5 +07 +2.1
Source: computed from data in IMF World
Economic Outlook, October 1985.3
real rates of interest, we focus on world rates of interest and assume that mdlvi—
duals have unlimited access to perfect world capital markets and that there are no
distortions. For a meaningful analysis of budget deficits we depart from the
"Ricardian proposition" and introduce a "myopic" element as in Blanchard (1985).
Accordingly, there are overlapping generations of rational individuals but due to
mortality each individual has a finite horizon. The coefficient of "myopia" reflects
the finiteness of the horizon. Suppose that I is the probability that an indivi-
dual survives from one period to the next and let I < 1 .Themagnitude of 1
influences savings in two ways. First, it introduces a risk premium (1—I) which
raises the rate of interest applicable to individuals, p ,abovethe world rate of
interest, r ,wherep =r+(1—1).Hence, it impacts on current wealth through the
heavier discounting of future disposable incomes. Second, it lowers the effective
saving propensity from 5(in the absence of mortality) to 1S
Government budgets are intertemporally balanced and government commitments
are honored. Hence, government debt (at the beginning of period zero) equals the
present values of current and future budget surpluses and the discount rate appli-
cable to government debt is the world rate of interest, r. We first divide the
horizon into two: the current period and the future period. All quantities pertain—
ing to the current period are indicated by a zero subscript and the paths of the
exogenous variables are assumed stationary across future periods.
Equilibrium necessitates that in the current period world output of tradable
goods is demanded and the discounted sum of future outputs of tradable goods equals
the discounted sums of future domestic and foreign demands. Likewise, in each
country current and future period outputs of non—tradable goods must be demanded.
The conditions that world markets for tradable goods clear in both current and future
periods are stated in equations (1)—(2). These equations already incorporate the
requirement that in each country the markets for non—tradable goods clear.14
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Equation (1) states that the sum of world private demand for current tradable goods
equals world supply To +Tonet of government spending (GTOGT0 +GTO).
In equation (1), W denotes aggregate domestic private wealth in periodzero, (i-i)
denotes the spending propensity and (1—s) is the consumption share of tradablegoods.
Hence, (1—)(1—yS)w0 is the home country's private demand. Analogously, foreign
private demand is (1—s )(1—Ió )timesforeign wealth W0. The specification of
private demands as a function of aggregate wealth reflects the assumption that in-
dividuals have an unlimited access to world capital markets. The value of wealth
equals the difference between the discounted sum of labor income and net private
debt. In equation (1) foreign current wealth is expressed as a negative func-
tion of the rate of interest, relfecting the role of r in discounting future in-
comes, and as a negative function of private debtB (square brackets indicate
functional dependence). The latter in turn equals the difference between the foreign
country's net external debt (which is the negative of the home country's net external
debt, —B0) and its net government debt,
Equation (2) states that the discounted sum of domestic and foreign demands
for future tradable goods equals the discounted sum of future world supply net of
government spending. The first term is the product of the consumption share of5
tradable goods (1—s) and total domestic future consumption. The latter equals the
sum of the savings of those alive in period zero, I6WQ ,andthe discounted sum of
the demand for future goods of those who will be born in the future and whose dis-
posable income in each period is1.1 Disposable income (in terms of tradable goods)
depends negatively on taxes, T ,andpositively on the relative price of non—tradable
goods p which in turn depends negatively on r (through its effect on future
wealth of those yet unborn) and positively on (through its effect on the demand
of those alive). The price, and thereby disposable income, also depends positively
on the parameter 8which measures the share of output of non—tradable goods
absorbed by the government. Analogous interpretation applies to the second term on
the left—hand—side of equation (2) representing the foreign demand for future
*
tradablegoods. In specifying foreign disposable income, I ,weincorporated the
functional dependence of on Bg0 and B. The right—hand—side of equation (2)
denotes the discounted sum of world supply of future tradable goods net of government
spending. Finally, the explicit expression for Bg0 reflects the intertemporal
budget constraint of the foreign government by which initial government debt must
equal the discounted sum of current and future budget surpluses. In that expression
***
theterms 0ONOO and 8 YMPmeasure current and future foreign government
spending on non—tradable goods, N where pis expressed as a negative function
of r and a positive function of Band B
go o
Equations (1)—(2) yield the equilibrium values of the home country's initial
wealth, W ,andthe world rate of interest, r ,forany given values of the para-
meters. In equilibrium the demand for non—tradable goods (1—lo)W0 equals the
supply net of government absorption (1_80)poYNo. Hence, the equilibrium price (the
inverse of the real exchange rate) is p =(1—lo)wQ/[(1—eO)YNO]
.Theequilibrium
is represented by point A in Figure 1. The PP schedule shows combinations of r
and pthat clear the market for present tradable goods. It is positively sloped
since a rise in r lowers foreign demand (by lowering )anda rise In p0Figure 1: Budget Deficits, the RealExchange Rate











raises domestic demand (by raising W0). Future tradable goods market clears along
the FF schedule. For a relatively small non—tradable goods sector the FF
schedule is negatively sloped since a rise in r creates an excess demand for future
tradable goods which must be offset by a fall in W0 (and therefore p0).
A budget deficit arising from a current tax cut necessitates a corresponding
rise in future taxes. As seen from equation (2) the rise in future taxes lowers
domestic disposable income, I ,andlowers the demand for future goods. For a given
world rate of interest the fall in demand can be eliminated by a rise in and
•Thus the FF schedule shifts to the right to F'F'. As is evident the horizon—
•0
talshift of the FF schedule is proportional to (1—1); if I =1the schedule and
the initial equilibrium remain intact (the Ricardian equivalence case). The new
equilibrium obtains at point B with a higher rate of interest, a higher relative
price of non—tradable goods, p0 ,anda higher level of domestic wealth and
tion. The higher rate of interest lowers foreign wealth and consumption and reduces
the foreign relative price of non—tradable goods. Thus, on the basis of the correla—
tions between domestic and foreign private sector's spending and between domestic and
foreign real exchange rates,the international transmission of the budget deficit is
negative. As an interpretation we note that since the budget deficit transfers
income from future generations (whose propensity to consume present goods is zero) to
the current generation (whose propensity to spend on present goods is positive), it
creates an excess demand for present tradable goods resulting in a rise in their
intertemporal relative price (the rate of interest). Likewise, it creates an excess
demand for domestic non—tradable goods and an excess supply of foreign non—tradable
goods and changes the temporal relative prices (the real exchange rates). Generally
speaking, this pattern of consumption, real interest rates, real exchange rates and
the underlying fiscal positions is roughly in accord with the selected facts reported
in section I (for a related analysis see Branson (1985)).7
A key characteristic of the conceptual frameworkunderlying the model is that
it is forward looking. Hence, the timing ofpolicy actions plays a critical role.
To illustrate this point we apply a simplifiedversion of the model in which the
economy produces only tradable goods, to an analysis oftransitory and permanent
balanced—budget changes in government spending. In thatcase equations (1)—(2) are
modified in an obvious manner2 and the equilibrium isillustrated by point A in
Figure 2.The positively sloped PP schedule shows combinationsof r and
that clear the market for present goods. Thenegatively sloped FF schedule de-
scribes combinations of r and Wthat clear the market for future goods. In this
simplified version of the model a current tax cut shifts theFF schedule to the
right (to F"F") and, as before, in the new equilibrium (pointB) the rate of interest
and domestic wealth are higher. A transitory risein current government spending by
LG creates an excess demand for presentgoods (since the private sector propensity
to spend on current goods is 1—15) and raisesthe rate of interest. Diagrama—
tically, the PP schedule shifts to the left byG0/(1—Yó) to P'P' and the new
equilibrium obtains at point C. Analogously, a balancedbudget rise in future
government spending by G creates an excess demand for futuregoods, shifts the FF
schedule to the left by G/[(r+1—y)] to F'F', andlowers the rate of interest.
The new equilibrium obtains at point D.In the former case both domestic and foreign
wealth fall and the transmission is positive; in thelatter case domestic wealth
falls, foreign wealth rises and the transmission isnegative. A permanent balanced—
budget rise in government spending raises demand for bothpresent and future goods
and shifts both schedules (with G =AG).The impact on the rate of interest
depends on the relative excess demands in both markets. If thehome country was a
* netsaver (i.e., if o>1/(1+r), or equivalently if > 5 )thepermanent rise in
government spending raises the relative demand forpresent goods and the rate of
interest rises; in that case foreign wealth falls. Theopposite, illustrated by
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Figure 2: Current and Future Government Spending,
Wealth and the Real Rate of Interest.8
unstable) relations between governmentspending, real rates of interest and the
international transmission can be explainedin part in terms of different
expectations concerning future spending.
In order to analyse the effects of futurebudget deficits we modify the
specification of the time aggregation of the modeland divide the horizon into three:
the present, the near future, and the distantfuture. It can be shown (see Frenke].
and Razin, 1986), that analogously tothe effects of current deficits a tax cut in
the near future (followed by acorresponding tax rise in the distant future) creates
an excess demand for goods in the nearfuture, and, raises the future rate of
interest, domestic wealth and spending whilelowering foreign wealth and spending.
Thus, the transmission of future budget deficitsis negative. Their impact on the
* currentshort—term rate of interest depends on thesaving propensities; ii s
thecurrent short—term interest rate rises andvice versa. In interpreting this
result we note that in the presentperiod no government action takes place and
changes in the current rate of interestresult only from changes inworld savings.
Atthe prevailing short term interest rateforeign wealth falls because of the rise
in the future rate of interest while therise in domestic wealth consequent on the
future budget deficit Is mitigated by the risein the future rate of interest. These
changes in wealth lower the foreign demand forcurrent goods and raise the domestic
demand for these goods. World demand forcurrent goods rises or falls depending on
the difference between the twospending propensities. The unambiguous fall in
foreign wealth indicates that even though thecurrent short—term rate of interest may
fall, the future budget deficit must raise theoverall "appropriate average" of short
and long—term rates of interest. In thiscontext we recall from section I that in
recent years changes of long—term real rates ofinterest exceeded those of short—term
rates. In addition to being induced by otherfactors, this fact can result in part
from expectations of future large U.S.budget deficit.9
In summary the model offers predictions about the inter—country correlations
among private—sector spending as well as about the links between fiscal policies real
exchange rates and world real interest rates. It was shown that budget deficits
arising from current or future tax cuts result in a negative inter—country correla-
tions among private consumption. On the other hand, the correlations implied by
changes in government spending depend on the timing of these changes and on the
current—account positions of the various countries. It was also shown that a budget
deficit arising from a tax cut raises real interest rates linking the period of the
tax cut and the future. The effect on the current short—term rate of interest of
either a future budget deficit or of permanent changes in government spending depend
on the current—account positions of the various economies. Finally, the current
short—term real rate of interest rises in response to a current transitory rise in
government spending and falls in response to a future transitory rise in government
spending.
Before concluding it is important to emphasize that by focusing on fiscal
policies and by excluding monetary considerations the analytical framework is limi-'
ted. As a result, although the analysis accounts for some of the facts outlined in
section I, it does not provide an explanation for the timing of the initial rise in
real rates of interest (in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s) and the
timing of the decline in real rates since mid 198g. The likely explanations for
these facts can be given in terms of U.S. monetary policy. Therefore, a useful
extension would include monetary considerations.10
FOOTNOTES
*
Professorsof Economics, University of Chicago,Chicago, IL 60637 and
the NBER; Tel—Aviv University,Tel—Aviv, Israel and the NBER,respectively.
11n order toverify this we note that in this model 11(1—i)is the
population size and hence (1—i) I is eachcohort's disposable income. Since
the effective discount factor isY/(1-1-r) ,thewealth of each cohort is the
discounted sum of each cohort's disposable
income [(i—i) IJ/[p/(1÷r) 1where
(1+r)/p is the annuity value of aperpetuity discounted by the effective
discount factor. Since in eachperiod there is a newly born cohort, the
discounted sum of all cohorts incomes is(1/i') times each cohort's wealth.
the absence of non—tradable goodswe eliminate the subscript T
w: set == 0,i[.J=Y—T 1*1.]y —T ,NN 0 ,and
W [•]= Y—T+(Y—T)Y/p +B+B.Theresulting model is analysed in 0 0 o go a
detail in Frenkel and Razin (1986).11
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